

## Prior Confessions and Mock Juror Verdicts<sup>1</sup>

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The present study tested the Supreme Court's assumption that jurors discount a coerced confession as unreliable and do not allow it to influence their decisions. In two experiments, subjects read a transcript of a trial in which testimony revealed that the defendant had confessed either on his own accord (no constraint), in response to an offer of leniency (positive constraint), in response to a threat of punishment (negative constraint), or not at all (control group). In Experiment 1, subjects discounted the negatively induced confession. However, their estimates of the probability that the defendant committed the crime were increased not only by the unconstrained confession, but by the positively constrained one as well. Experiment 2 essentially replicated this pattern for probability-of-commission estimates and verdicts despite the additional finding that the positively constrained confession was in fact perceived as involuntary. The potential danger of admitting the latter as evidence was noted and specific recommendations were made.

Trials by jury often involve a defendant who previously made and then withdrew an out-of-court confession. The legal admissibility of such a confession as evidence is quite controversial. In *Jackson vs. Denno* (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to a pretrial determination that any confession he or she made to officials was voluntarily given, and not the outcome of physical or psychological coercion, which the Constitution forbids. Only if the fact finder (usually the judge) at this coercion hearing determines that the confession was in fact voluntary may it then be introduced at trial to the jury.

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But what should be the standard of proof by which the pretrial fact finder should judge voluntariness? This question is the source of the controversy. Some states adopted the stringent criterion that voluntariness must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." In contrast, other states sanctioned lesser standards, including proof of voluntariness by a mere "preponderance of evidence." In *Lego vs. Twomy* (1972), the Supreme Court resolved this question and ruled that the admissibility of a confession may be determined by a preponderance of the evidence. It reasoned that the sole aim of the 1964 decision was to exclude the evidence because it was illegally obtained and in order to safeguard the individual's right to due process, not because of the probable unreliability of a coerced confession. The court assumed, in fact, that jurors can be trusted to use potentially unreliable confessions cautiously. Specifically, the court justified the latter position by stating that:

Our decision was not based in the slightest on the fear that juries might misjudge the accuracy of confessions and arrive at erroneous determinations of guilt or innocence . . . Nothing in *Jackson* questioned the province or capacity of juries to assess the truthfulness of confessions. (p. 625)

Guided by this faith in jurors' capacities, the Supreme Court thus justified a lower standard by which the fact finder may admit a confession whose voluntariness is in question.

Is this assumption well founded? Although there is no research which bears directly on how jurors use information about a coerced confession, the cognitive process involved in such a decision is familiar to attribution researchers. Jurors are, after all, confronted with a behavior whose causal locus is ambiguous. If a defendant confesses while under threat during an interrogation, that confession may be viewed as either reflecting defendant's true guilt or as a means of avoiding negative consequences of silence. Ideally, jurors employing Kelley's (1971) discounting principle would be less certain about the truth and reliability of this kind of elicited confession than they would about one which is made in the absence of threat as a plausible cause. Indeed, adult observers' use of the discounting principle has been experimentally confirmed (Karniol & Ross, 1976).

On the other hand, a number of investigators have reported that attributors attach insufficient weight to situational causes and accept behavior at "face value" (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). In a series of experiments, Jones and Harris (1967) had subjects read an attitudinal essay or hear a speech presumably written by another student. In one study, subjects read an essay in which the communicator either supported or criticized the unpopular Castro regime in Cuba. Some subjects were told that the communicator had freely chosen to advocate this position (choice condition) while others were told that the communicator was assigned to endorse the position by a political science instructor

(no-choice condition). Results indicated that subjects in the no-choice condition clearly perceived the situational determinants of the communicator's opinion. Nevertheless, their impressions about the communicator's true belief were markedly influenced by the particular position he had espoused. Subjects thus did not dismiss the dispositional cause of a situationally determined opinion. This phenomenon has since been replicated for attitudes toward desegregation (Jones & Harris, 1967) and the legalization of marijuana (Jones, Worchel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971), and under increasingly salient situational causes (Snyder & Jones, 1974).

The parallels between this research paradigm and the coerced confession are striking. In both, the observer is faced with a verbal behavior which he or she may attribute either to the actor's true attitude or to the pressures of the behavioral situation. Yet, while the Supreme Court assumes that jurors would reject an involuntary confession as unreliable and not allow it to guide their decisions, previous research suggests that jurors might not totally reject the confession when considering the actor's true guilt. The present experiment was therefore designed to test these divergent predictions.

To complicate matters further, the legal system defines coercion as either a *threat* of harm and punishment or a *promise* of leniency and immunity from prosecution (LaBuy, 1963). Both are viewed to be equivalent conditions for a determination of involuntariness. In fact, jurors are sometimes provided with this legal definition in the judge's charge. Most states follow what is known as the "orthodox rule"—once the judge decides to admit a confession, the voluntariness issue is never introduced to the jury.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, jurors—like subjects in the present study—do not receive any special instructions on the matter. However, many states do provide that even after the judge has admitted the evidence, he or she must instruct the jury that they are also to decide the issue of voluntariness before rendering a verdict. In states employing this latter procedure, two forms of the approved instruction are available (Mathes & DeVitt, 1965). One form simply asks jurors to determine voluntariness and reject a coerced confession; the other also operationally defines the coercion as either a positive or negative inducement and explains the reasons for its unreliability.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>See Wigmore (1970, pp. 585-593) for a listing of the states that conform to the orthodox rule.

<sup>4</sup>The relevant portion of the short form reads: "If the evidence in the case does not convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was made voluntarily and intentionally, the jury should disregard it entirely. On the other hand, if the evidence in the case does show beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was in fact voluntarily and intentionally made by a defendant, the jury should consider it as evidence in the case against the defendant who voluntarily and intentionally made the confession" (Mathes & DeVitt, 1965, p. 101).

Unfortunately, this assumed equivalence conflicts with the hypothesis that observers attribute more responsibility (Kelley, 1971) and subjective freedom (Bramel, 1969) to a person for actions taken to gain a positive outcome than for similar actions aimed at avoiding punishment. Kruglanski and Cohen (1974) tested a variant of this hypothesis and found that an actor who chose between two unattractive alternatives was viewed as having a lower freedom of choice than one who chose between two attractive alternatives or one attractive-one unattractive alternative. The implications of these findings for how jurors might utilize different types of coerced confession are clear. Specifically, they suggest that a confession which is made under coercive influence of a promise of leniency (positive constraint) will be perceived by jurors to be more voluntary and hence as more indicative of guilt than one which followed a threat of punishment (negative constraint). Accordingly, the present experiment incorporated two versions of a coerced confession—one in which the admission aimed at gaining a positive outcome and one in which it aimed at avoiding a negative outcome.

Subjects in the present experiment read a detailed transcript of a criminal trial in which testimony revealed that the accused had confessed to the arresting officer either on his own initiative, in response to an offer of leniency, or in response to a threat of punishment. In a fourth group, no evidence of a confession was included in the transcript. Subjects then rendered their verdicts and answered other case-related questions. Of interest were first whether an elicited confession produces as high a conviction rate as a voluntary confession or as low a conviction rate as no-confession, and second whether there are differences between the two types of situational coercion.

## EXPERIMENT 1

### Method

#### *Subjects*

Sixty-four introductory psychology students (33 male, 31 female) participated. The experiment was conducted in 12 sessions ranging in size from 3 to 8.

*(footnote 4 continued from page 135)*

The longer version adds the following: "If it appears from the evidence in the case that a confession would not have been made, but for some threat of harm or some offer of promise or immunity from prosecution, or leniency in punishment, or other reward, such a confession should not be considered as having been voluntarily made, because of the danger that a person accused might be persuaded by the pressure of hope or fear to confess as facts things which are not true, in an effort to avoid threatened harm or punishment, or to secure a promised reward" (Mathes & DeVitt, 1965, p. 103).

Within each session, four versions of a transcript (confession-no constraint, confession-promise, confession-threat, no confession) were randomly distributed, yielding  $n = 16$  per group (the proportion of males and females in each group was roughly equivalent).

*Stimulus Materials*

The 25-page transcript was derived from one that had been previously employed in our current program of research (Juhnke, Vought, Pyszczyński, Dane, Losure, & Wrightsman, 1979). The trial, entitled “United States versus Ronald Oliver, May 2, 1972,” was based on an actual criminal case in which the defendant was charged with transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce. Generally stated, the government’s case was based on the testimony of a used car salesman, who identified Ronald Oliver as the person who stole the car from the lot, and the statement of a highway patrolman, who stopped the defendant for speeding and subsequently made the arrest. The defendant, on the other hand, maintained that he was driving an acquaintance’s car and had no knowledge that the vehicle had been stolen. The transcript thus consisted of opening statements by counsel, examination of two prosecution witnesses (the salesman from whom the car was stolen and the arresting officer) and one defense witness (the defendant), closing arguments, and the judge’s instruction to the jury.<sup>5</sup>

The four versions of the transcript were identical except for the inclusion of testimony which indicated that after the officer informed the defendant that he was under arrest for stealing the car, Ron Oliver confessed. The following small portion of the patrolman’s testimony was varied:

1. *Confession-no constraint*

- Q: What was Mr. Oliver’s reaction to the accusation?
- A: As soon as I mentioned it to the defendant, he confessed that he had in fact stolen the the car from the Parker Ford Company.
- Q: Was that the end of your conversation?
- A: Pretty much, yes.
- Q: So Ron Oliver actually admitted that he stole the car?
- A: Yes, sir. He did.

2. *Confession-promise*

- Q: What was Mr. Oliver’s reaction to the accusation?
- A: When I first mentioned it to the defendant, he flatly denied having anything to do with stealing a car.
- Q: Was that the end of your conversation?

<sup>5</sup>The judge’s charge was brief and very general. It merely reiterated the accusation, outlined the jury’s duties, and explicated the requirements of proof (i.e., that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). No mention was made of the confession or the issue of voluntariness.

A: No sir, Then I told Mr. Oliver that if he confesses to the crime, he would be treated well during his detention and that the judge would surely be a lot easier on him—maybe even a suspended sentence.

Q: How did the defendant respond to this offer?

A: This time, he confessed that he had in fact stolen the car from the Parker Ford Company.

Q: So Ron Oliver actually admitted that he stole the car?

A: Yes, sir. He did.

### 3. *Confession-threat*

Q: What was Mr. Oliver's reaction to the accusation?

A: When I first mentioned it to the defendant, he flatly denied having anything to do with stealing a car.

Q: Was that the end of your conversation?

A: No, sir. Then I told Mr. Oliver that if he does not confess to the crime, he would be treated very poorly during his detention and that the judge would surely be very hard on him—maybe even the maximum sentence.

Q: How did the defendant respond to this threat?

A: This time he confessed that he did in fact steal the car from the Parker Ford Company.

Q: So Ron Oliver actually admitted that he stole the car?

A: Yes, sir. He did.

### 4. *No-confession*

Q: What was Mr. Oliver's reaction to the accusation?

A: As soon as I mentioned it to the defendant, he flatly denied having anything to do with stealing a car.

Q: Was that the end of the conversation?

A: Pretty much, yes.

Q: So Ron Oliver actually denied having stolen the car?

A: Yes, sir. He did.

## *Procedure*

Upon entering, subjects were handed one version of the transcript. The title page read, "Enclosed is a transcript of a trial in which the defendant, Ronald Oliver, is charged with a violation of the Dire Act—transporting a stolen car across state lines. Read the trial carefully as if you were on the jury deciding the case. After considering the evidence, you will be asked to render your verdict." The transcript took about 25 minutes to read, after which subjects filled out a brief questionnaire individually and without deliberation. The dependent variables were a verdict (guilty-not guilty) and a confidence rating in that judgment (0-8 scale), an estimate of the probability that the defendant committed the crime (0-100%, in multiples of 5), and ratings of the extent to which subjects' decisions were influenced by the testimony of each witness—the used car salesman, the arresting officer, and the defendant (0-8 scales, where 0 = not at all and 8 = very much).

## RESULTS

Only 22 subjects voted guilty (34%) while 43 voted not guilty (66%). An inspection of verdicts in the four groups revealed conviction rates of .56 in the confession-no constraint group, .38 in the confession-promise group, .25 in the confession-threat group, and .19 in the no-confession group. The overall difference among groups, however, only approached significance ( $\chi^2(3) = 5.82$ ,  $p < .15$ ). A scalar variable was defined by combining subjects' verdicts with their 0-8 confidence ratings (confidence itself was unaffected by the independent variable). Specifically, positive confidence values were assigned to guilty verdicts and negative values to verdicts of not-guilty. Scores could thus range from -8 (maximum confidence in a not-guilty verdict) to +8 (maximum confidence in a guilty verdict). As with the  $\chi^2$ , a one-way analysis of variance on these verdict-confidence scores indicated that the differences among the four groups were only marginally significant ( $F(3,60) = 2.36$ ,  $p < .10$ ).

After rendering a verdict and confidence rating, subjects indicated the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime by circling a number from 0-100. In contrast to the judgmental data, these probability-of-commission estimates were significantly affected by the confession manipulation ( $F(3,60) = 4.26$ ,  $p < .01$ ). In particular, the defendant was viewed as more likely to have committed the crime when he confessed without external constraint ( $M = 65.63$ ), or when he confessed in response to a promise of leniency ( $M = 55.0$ ), than when no confession ( $M = 30.0$ ) was made ( $p < .01$  and  $p < .05$  via Newman-Keuls tests, respectively). The confession-threat manipulation produced a relatively moderate probability-of-commission ( $M = 47.19$ ) which tended to be lower than the estimate in the confession-no-constraint group ( $p < .10$ ).

Finally, no significant differences were obtained on ratings of any of the witnesses, including the highway patrolman who testified that the defendant had confessed. Thus, despite the effect the confession testimony had on probability-of-commission estimates, subjects in the confession groups did not acknowledge having been more influenced by the witness who introduced that information than the no-confession subjects.

In summary, information about a prior confession and its surrounding circumstances influenced subjects' estimates of the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime. Some interesting differences emerged on this measure. First, the absolute probative value of a retracted confession was demonstrated by the fact that probability-of-commission estimates were significantly higher in the confession-no constraint group than in the no-confession group. Beyond that, the positive and negative constraints did not produce equivalent results. Compared to the no-confession control group, subjects' beliefs about the defendant's culpability were significantly increased by a confession that was elicited by a positive offer but not by one that was elicited by a threat. The potential danger of admitting the former as evidence is thus apparent.

Two major shortcomings of the present results deserve mention. First, the differences cited above were obtained for subjects' probability-of-commission estimates, but not for the practically important variable—verdicts. This failure to obtain differences in verdict could have resulted from the fact that the case against the defendant was weak (a mean of probability-of-commission estimate of only 49%) and did not permit enough variability in judgments (see Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, 1976). Second, we can only infer that the probability-of-commission differences were mediated by perceived choice since the latter variable was not directly assessed. A second study was therefore conducted with the following goals in mind: to replicate the probability-of-commission findings using a stronger (i.e., pro-prosecution) version of the case, to determine whether this increase in probability-of-commission produces a confession-constraint effect on verdicts, and to measure perceived choice directly.

## EXPERIMENT 2

### Method

Seventy-two introductory psychology students (32 male, 39 female, 1 uncoded) were randomly assigned to one of the four groups ( $n = 18$  per group). Stylistically and substantively, the transcript was very similar to the one employed in the first experiment. A number of changes were made in order to bolster the prosecutor's case against the defendant, and the revised transcript was 22 pages in length.<sup>6</sup> The portion of testimony which contained the confession manipulation and the experimental procedure were identical to that of the first experiment.

In addition to the dependent variables assessed in the first study, subjects indicated the standard of proof they thought was necessary for conviction by answering, "The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a \_\_\_% chance that he committed the crime." After rendering their verdicts and answering the remaining questions, subjects in the experimental (confession) groups also indicated whether the confession was voluntary or involuntary and how confident they were in that decision.

## RESULTS

Table 1 presents the data for all scalar variables.

<sup>6</sup>In order to determine the efficacy of the changes that were made, the resultant transcript was pre-tested. Specifically, this revised version of the no-confession case was distributed to 10 undergraduates who provided probability-of-commission estimates. Compared to the control group in Experiment 1 ( $M = 30\%$ ), the mean probability-of-commission estimate for this version was 44%.

TABLE 1  
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR THE SCALAR VARIABLES OF  
EXPERIMENT 2

Scalar variables	Experimental (confession groups)			Control (no confession) group
	no constraint	positive constraint	negative constraint	
Verdict-confidence scores	3.83 <sub>a</sub>	.56 <sub>ab</sub>	-2.67 <sub>bc</sub>	-4.39 <sub>c</sub>
Probability-of-commission	76.67 <sub>a</sub>	63.33 <sub>ab</sub>	51.39 <sub>bc</sub>	40.28 <sub>c</sub>
Reasonable doubt	85.56	82.28	85.94	92.22
Witness 1 (salesman)	4.17	4.33	4.17	4.44
Witness 2 (patrolman)	6.44 <sub>a</sub>	4.78 <sub>b</sub>	4.44 <sub>b</sub>	4.06 <sub>b</sub>
Witness 3 (defendant)	4.72	5.83	4.94	4.94
Voluntariness-confidence	5.22 <sub>a</sub>	-1.50 <sub>b</sub>	-3.39 <sub>b</sub>	

Note. Means not sharing a common subscript differ at  $p < .05$  by Newman-Keuls test.

*Probability-of-Commission Estimates*

A major goal of the second study was to increase the perceived probability that the defendant committed the crime in order to produce greater variability in verdicts. This goal was achieved, as the overall mean probability-of-commission estimate was .58 (compared to .49 in Experiment 1).

Moreover, the pattern of group differences replicated those produced in the first experiment ( $F(3,68) = 6.32, p < .001$ )—estimates were highest in the no-constraint confession group and lowest in the no-confession control group. Further tests revealed that the positive constraint produced probability-of-commission estimates which were higher than those of the control group and not significantly different from those obtained in the no-constraint condition. On the other hand, the estimates of negative-constraint subjects were lower than in the no-constraint group and not significantly different from those obtained in the control group (see Table 1).

*Verdicts*

Overall, 29 of the 72 subjects (40%) rendered guilty verdicts, and the difference among groups was highly significant ( $\chi^2(3) = 22.91, p < .001$ ). Specifically, the proportion of guilty verdicts was highest in the no-constraint confession group (.78) and lowest in the control group (.11). The proportion of guilty verdicts in the negative-constraint group (.22) was significantly lower than in the no-constraint group and equivalent (i.e., not significantly different) to those in the control group ( $\chi^2 = 9.0, p < .01$  and  $\chi^2(1) < 1$ , respectively). Yet, the confession which was elicited by a positive offer produced a greater proportion of guilty verdicts (.50) than in the control group ( $\chi^2(1) = 10.12, p < .01$ ) and was not significantly different from the no-constraint condition ( $\chi^2(1) = 1.93, p < .15$ ).

Continuous verdict-confidence scores (-8 to +8 range) were submitted to a one-way ANOVA which also indicated a significant difference among groups ( $F(3,68) = 8.27, p < .001$ ) and a pattern which closely paralleled the judgmental data (see Table 1).

*Witness Ratings*

Again, the confession-constraint manipulation did not affect subjects' ratings of how influential were the testimonies of the used car salesman and the defendant. It did, however, influence subjects' ratings of the highway patrolman who introduced the relevant testimony ( $F(3,68) = 4.24, p < .01$ ). Very simply, Table 1 shows that the patrolman's testimony was viewed as more important in the no-constraint group than in all the others.

*Reasonable Doubt*

Recall the subjects defined their standards of reasonable doubt by answering the question, "The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a \_\_\_% chance that he committed the crime." Interestingly, the overall estimate of reasonable doubt was 86.5, which is almost identical to that previously found using a videotape of the Ron Oliver case (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979) and to that initially reported by Simon and Mahan (1971). No group differences emerged on this variable; presumably, the obtained differences in verdict followed from differences along the probability-of-commission dimension and not from an increase or decrease in the standards set for conviction.

*Voluntariness Judgments*

Subjects in the three experimental groups ( $N = 54$ ) judged whether or not the defendant had confessed voluntarily and without coercion, and then indicated their confidence (0-8) in these decisions. As it turned out, voluntariness

judgments were significantly affected by the circumstances surrounding the confession ( $\chi^2(2) = 20.62, p < .001$ ). Subsequent tests indicated a greater proportion of voluntariness judgments in the no-constraint group (.94) than in either the positive (.39) or negative (.22) constraint groups ( $p < .01$ ), which, in turn, did not significantly differ from each other ( $\chi^2(1) < 1$ ). As with the verdicts, a scalar variable was defined by assigning positive confidence values to "voluntary" and negative values to "involuntary" judgments. A significant difference among groups ( $F(2,51) = 13.10, p < .001$ ) corroborated the judgmental data—the confession was seen as more voluntary in the no-constraint group than in the positive or negative constraint conditions (see Table 1). Thus, while the negative and no-constraint groups responded in the predicted manner, results for the positive-constraint group were surprising. Quite unexpectedly, these latter subjects acknowledged that the confession which influenced their verdicts was involuntary and coerced.

### Summary

Compared to the first experiment, subjects in Experiment 2 read a stronger version of the case. Nevertheless, the pattern of results was essentially replicated. The negatively induced confession had no significant effect (i.e., compared to no-confession) on subjects' probability-of-commission estimates, verdicts, or witness ratings; also, most subjects viewed this confession as involuntary. Results for the positive-constraint group were somewhat more complex. Subjects in this group stated that they were not particularly influenced by the "crucial" testimony and in fact viewed the confession as involuntary. Yet they were clearly affected by this confession evidence which increased their probability-of-commission estimates and the proportion of guilty verdicts.

### DISCUSSION

Two interrelated points of dispute between the legal system's assumptions and the social perception literature were addressed. First, the Supreme Court's presumption that jurors can accurately assess the truthfulness of confessions is challenged by research which suggests that observers often accept a situationally caused statement or behavior at face value. Second, the legal definition of a coerced confession as one which is prompted by either an offer or a threat conflicts with the finding that observers phenomenologically treat the positive and negative constraints very differently.

In the present study, the prediction that jurors would discount a coerced confession as unreliable was only partially supported and must be qualified by reference to Bramel's (1969) and Kelley's (1971) hypotheses about perceived choice. When the coercive influence was operationally defined as a threat of harm or punishment, subjects clearly discounted the confession

evidence—they viewed the confession as involuntary and manifested a relatively low rate of conviction. However, when coercion took the form of an offer or a promise of leniency, subjects were unable or unwilling to dismiss the prior confession. Under these circumstances, subjects conceded that the defendant had confessed involuntarily, but voted guilty anyway. Consistent with previous research (Jones & Harris, 1967), then, the defendant's behavior was accepted as probative despite the presence and perception of a positive constraint. At this point, a theoretically meaningful ambiguity in the interpretation of these results deserves mention. Specifically, it is possible that the differences obtained between the *kinds* of constraint (i.e., positive vs. negative) were, in fact, related to differences in the perceived *degree* of cause. Wells (1979) recently found that people often erroneously assume that punishment is a more powerful form of behavioral inducement than is a reward contingency. In the present study, subjects may thus have accepted the positively constrained confession not because the constraint was positive per se, but because it was perceived as being a relatively weak inducement.<sup>7</sup>

In view of the fact that disputed confessions arise in approximately 20% of all cases (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), the problem addressed here is a real one. What, then, are the practical implications of these results? The present findings suggest that perhaps the courts should explicitly distinguish between positive and negative forms of coercion (or among varying degrees of coercion) and exercise caution when admitting the former as evidence. Toward this end, at least two types of safeguard could be implemented within current regulations. First, the state courts could, at their discretion, require a stringent standard of proof (e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt) by which to determine at pre-trial hearings the voluntariness and hence admissibility of a prior confession. Alternatively, judicial instruction could serve as the vehicle by which to correct jurors' biases. It was noted earlier that in states where the jury decides the issue of voluntariness, two general forms of instruction are available—a short form in which the judge simply tells jurors to discount a coerced confession and a longer form in which coercion is additionally defined as either a promise or a threat. If indeed subjects in the positive constraint groups of the present study acted out of ignorance (after all, no legal definition was provided) rather than disagreement with the law, then the longer version of the instruction should effectively sensitize jurors to the dangers of relying on a positively induced confession. Of course the efficacy of this strategy is open to question since directive instructions may backfire (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977).

<sup>7</sup>This alternative interpretation is refuted only indirectly by the fact that in Experiment 2, voluntariness judgments in the positive and negative constraint groups were not statistically different. Admittedly, however, equally frequent recognition of some constraint does not mean an equivalence in the perceived degrees of constraint.

Finally, the generalizability of the present study is an issue which merits some discussion. While, the internal consistency and replicability of results within the employed paradigm have been amply demonstrated, the external validity of these experiments is limited by the fact that we assessed the judgments of individual, nondeliberating subjects. It is entirely conceivable that questions about the reliability of evidence would arise during group discussion and serve to decrease jurors' use of a positively-induced confession (see Kaplan & Miller, 1978).

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